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In 1984, the U.S. Congress enacted the Child Protection Act, which made it a 
crime to purchase sexually explicit images of children. Prior to the Act’s 
passage, a man named Keith Jacobson had mail-ordered two Bare Boys 
magazines from a bookstore. His name remained on the bookstore’s mailing 
list, which U.S. Postal Service inspectors later acquired. Investigators undertook 
a plot to get Jacobson to purchase some freshly criminalized pornographic 
material. Posing as members of fabricated organizations, they sent Jacobson 
several letters that decried censorship and an “outdated puritan morality,” 
fueled by enemies of free expression. After repeated offers to sell Jacobson child 
pornography, he placed an order with them, and was subsequently arrested.1 
 Did the government do anything wrong by encouraging Jacobson to 
commit the crime? The U.S. Supreme Court avowed it had: “In their zeal to 
enforce the law, Government agents may not originate a criminal design, 
implant in an innocent person’s mind the disposition to commit a criminal act, 
and then induce commission of the crime so that the Government may 
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prosecute.” 2  The state’s operations, the Court reasoned, did not identify 
violators of the Act; it created them. In so doing, it violated the legal 
contravention against criminal entrapment. 
 Political and legal philosophers tend to agree that entrapment is 
problematic. Yet the available accounts of entrapment’s wrongness are, I 
believe, incomplete. Moreover, because we lack a comprehensive account of 
why entrapment is wrong—because we have failed to grasp one of the most 
salient dimensions of its wrongness—we have failed to notice it in all of its 
manifestations. 
 The first task of this article will be to illuminate one crucial explanation of 
why entrapment is wrong, which available accounts have failed to capture. I 
shall argue that entrapment is wrong, in part, because it subverts the moral 
capacities of entrapped persons. To subvert an agent’s moral capacities is to 
interfere with the agent’s practical reasoning in ways that increase the 
likelihood she will culpably choose to act wrongly. Such activity, I contend, is 
incompatible with respect for that agent. Specifically, it is incompatible with a 
core regulative attitude that respect enjoins: an attitude of support for the 
successful operation of others’ moral capacities. 
 This view differs from prevailing accounts in several ways. Firstly, it 
denies that the wrongness of entrapment necessarily inheres in the prosecution 
and eventual punishment of the entrapped defendant. Rather, entrapment’s 
wrongness partly attaches to the initial act of inducement itself: in the 
objectionable way that an agent relates to another agent when the former sets 
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up the latter to fail morally. Secondly, my account reveals an important 
commonality between official entrapment by state officials, on the one hand, 
and private instigation to criminal offense by one’s fellow citizens, on the other. 
The wrongness of both, I propose, is partly traceable to the same underlying 
moral principle. Finally, the view I defend does not rely on the assumption that 
entrapment is necessarily intentional. The duty to refrain from conduct that 
sets up others to fail morally is one that can also be violated through 
negligence. 
 That final point of difference sets the stage for this article’s second core 
task. The version of subversion we observe in familiar entrapment cases 
involves intentional interventions by state actors against targeted individuals. 
Once the possibility of negligent subversion is acknowledged, however, we can 
recognize more diffuse, macro-level versions of the phenomenon. What I term 
structural entrapment transpires when the state negligently sets up its own 
citizens to fail morally as a foreseeable consequence of the contexts its policies 
create. I shall employ the case of urban injustice in the contemporary United 
States to illustrate how subversion can be structural, suggesting that a gauntlet 
of unjust laws makes it rational for citizens to join violent criminal drug gangs. 
Thus one need not be the deliberate target of a sting operation to consider 
herself subverted; it is enough that she is subjected to (certain) criminogenic 
social policies. The urban poor thus have an even more powerful complaint 
against their state than we initially believed. Far more perniciously than simply 
subjecting them to unjust policies, the state has undercut their quests to be just 
persons. 
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I. The Limitations of Prevailing Accounts 
Why object to entrapment? Among the variety of reasons offered in the 
scholarly literature are the following:  
a. Culpability. Entrapped defendants, like persons who have been 
coerced or drugged, may not be culpable for their offences; 
entrapment morally exculpates offenders, rendering their punishment 
unjustified.3 
b. Incoherence. Entrapment is incoherent; the state acts inconsistently 
when it insists that citizens adhere to the law, but then takes measures 
to induce them to break it.4  
c.  Crime Prevention. By entrapping persons into committing crime, the 
state violates its duty to decrease, rather than increase, the crime rate.5 
d. Unfairness. Because only some susceptible persons will find 
themselves targets of a sting operation, it is a matter of bad luck who 
is entrapped and who isn’t. 6 
                                                        
3 This argument is suggested by the fact that, under U.S. law, entrapment is a defense in court. 
This rationale is also suggested by U.S. Supreme Court; see Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 
435 (1932). For a defense, see Paul M. Hughes, “What is Wrong with Entrapment?”, The 
Southern Journal of Philosophy 42, 1 (2004), 45-60. 
4 This argument finds expression in Gerald Dworkin, “The Serpent Beguiled Me and I Did Eat: 
Entrapment and the Creation of Crime,” Law and Philosophy, 4 (1985), 17-39, p. 30; Andrew 
Ashworth, “What is Wrong with Entrapment?”, p. 310; Antony Duff et al., The Trial on Trial, 
Volume 3: Towards a Normative Theory of the Criminal Trial (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007), 
pp. 242ff.    
5 This argument is suggested in Andrew Ashworth, “What is Wrong with Entrapment?” 
Singapore Journal of Legal Studies (1999): 293-317; B.G. Stitt and G.G. James, “Entrapment and 
the Entrapment Defense: Dilemmas for a Democratic Society,” Law and Philosophy, 3 (1984), 111-
31; and Jonathan C. Carlson, “The Act Requirement and the Foundations of the Entrapment 
Defense,” Virginia Law Review, 73 (1987), 1011-1108. 
6 E.g., U.S. v. Twigg, 558 F. 2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978), which speaks of “fundamental fairness” at 381; 
see also Dworkin, “The Serpent Beguiled Me,” p. 32. 
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e. Manipulation. Insofar as entrapment serves some useful public 
purpose, such as deterrence, entrapped offenders are disrespectfully 
used merely as a means to an end.7  
f. Sadism. Entrapment sadistically transforms punishment from 
something that wrongdoers deserve or that is instrumentally valuable 
to something that we should pursue for its own sake.8 
g. Deception. Through staging entrapment operations, the state 
contravenes its duty not to lie to its citizens, thereby tainting the 
evidence secured through such deception.9 
h. Standing. A state that induces its citizens to break the law forfeits its 
moral standing to hold those citizens accountable; it thus lacks the 
authority to punish entrapped defendants for their crimes.10 
I doubt whether any of these reasons succeed as decisive, or even pro tanto, 
considerations against entrapment. 11  Culpability implausibly suggests that 
encouragement diminishes another’s moral responsibility when performed by 
an undercover state official, but not by an ordinary citizen. In a recent case, a 
group of men conceived a plot to bomb two New York City synagogues at the 
                                                        
7  Anthony M. Dillof, “Unraveling Unlawful Entrapment,” Journal of Criminal Law and 
Criminology, 94 (2004), 827-96, p. 876. 
8 Andrew Carlon, “Entrapment, Punishment, and the Sadistic State,” Virginia Law Review, 93 
(2007), 1081-1134. 
9 The idea that entrapment is wrong because the evidence secured through it is procedurally 
improper is suggested by English and Welsh law, in which entrapment triggers a stay of 
prosecution.  
10 This argument is suggested—and rejected—in a brief discussion in  R.A. Duff, “Blame, Moral 
Standing, and the Legitimacy of the Criminal Trial,” Ratio, 23 (2010), 123-40, pp. 133ff. See also 
G.A. Cohen, “Casting the First Stone: Who Can, and Who Can’t, Condemn the Terrorists,” 
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements, 81 (2006), 113-136. 
11 This list is not, of course, exhaustive. Other object to entrapment, to name one example, 
because it is epistemically disabling: it undermines the government’s knowledge of the kind of 
person the entrapped offender is. See Kleinig, The Ethics of Policing, p. 158.  
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encouragement of an undercover FBI informant.12 Were we to imagine the 
informant as simply an ordinary citizen, we would never entertain the 
suggestion that those he encouraged were consequently exculpated. 13 
Incoherence and Crime Prevention are also unpromising. We need only to 
imagine a well-publicized, routine practice of virtue-testing by undercover 
police to see that entrapment could be part of a cohesive government strategy 
to slash crime, as citizens would trust no one encouraging them to do wrong.14 
And Unfairness fails to convince for the simple reason that if entrapment 
unfairly catches some and spares others, then all punishment is unfair for the 
same reason (as many non-entrapped criminals are bound to go uncaught, too). 
Yet that result cannot be right. 
The other theories have greater promise, but suffer from various 
limitations. Manipulation objects to entrapment because it punishes citizens as 
a means to deter others, but this controversially implies the rejection of 
deterrent punishment in general.15 Sadism relies on the widely disputed thesis 
that the permissibility of an action depends on the agent’s intention or 
motivation. Deception counterintuitively condemns all sting operations, even 
                                                        
12 The court ultimately decided that it was not an instance of entrapment at all, since it 
established that the perpetrators possessed sufficient predisposition to commit the crime 
independent of their agent provocateur’s encouragement. I shall question the significance of 
predisposition later on, but for now, let us simplify matters by assuming, pace the court, that 
this was, in fact, a case of entrapment. See Al Baker and Javier C. Hernandez, “4 Accused of 
Bombing Plot at Bronx Synagogues,” The New York Times, May 20, 2009, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/21/nyregion/ 21arrests.html; accessed 17 July 2014. 
13 For other criticism of this argument, see Ashworth, “What is Wrong with Entrapment?”, pp. 
311-12; Mike Redmayne, “Exploring Entrapment,” in Lucia Zedner and Julian V. Roberts (eds.), 
Principles and Values in Criminal Law and Criminal Justice: Essays in Honour of Andrew 
Ashworth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 158; and Dan Squires, “The Problem with 
Entrapment,” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies,  26 (2006): 351-376, p. 362. 
14 For similar criticism, see Redmayne, “Exploring Entrapment,” p. 160. 
15 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing this out.  
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those against ongoing criminal masterminds. And Standing controversially 
presupposes the truth of expressive or communicative theories of punishment. 
 To be sure, these reservations hardly qualify as decisive refutations. No 
doubt some of the considerations above succeed, under some interpretation, in 
capturing at least part of why we rightly balk at criminal entrapment. But they 
cannot be the whole story, for there is a further difficulty common to most (if 
not all) prevailing views, and it is this particular difficulty that will concern me 
here.  
 To see the difficulty, consider again Standing: the idea that a state lacks 
the moral standing to blame and punish those whom it entraps. Such a view 
has two implications: firstly, that entrapped offenders should not be punished; 
and secondly, that provided that the state declines to prosecute and punish the 
entrapped wrongdoer, entrapment’s wrongness is largely obviated. Both 
implications, however, are difficult to accept. Recall the case of young Muslim 
men coaxed into bombing a synagogue. Firstly, it is not obvious that someone 
who is convinced to bomb a synagogue should go without punishment.16 As I 
mentioned, we would never contemplate that result in the case of someone 
instigated by a private citizen. Secondly, even without punishment, there 
remains something deeply morally unsavory about agents of the state going out 
of their way to cause other moral agents to act wrongly. It is highly 
counterintuitive to think that entrapment would have become morally 
unproblematic in our example case, if only the FBI had neglected to press 
                                                        
16 Indeed, entrapment law often makes an exception precisely for cases involving dangerous 
crimes. See U.S. Model Penal Code, Article 2, Section 2.13, Part 3. 
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charges once the men were prevented from detonating the bombs. Or consider 
again the case of Keith Jacobsen: even if federal agents had declined to press 
charges, they still would have acted wrongly by entrapping him into ordering 
child pornography.17 And while none of the theories we have considered is 
strictly incompatible with the claim that entrapment is wrong independent of 
subsequent prosecution and punishment, none can motivate this intuition.18 
There must, then, be some further reason to object to entrapment, independent 
of any objections we might have to punishing entrapped offenders.  
 
II. Subversion 
When an agent of the state entraps a citizen, the former instigates the latter to 
commit crime, only then to punish her for it. The accounts of entrapment I 
have so far considered focus their concern tightly on the significance of the 
facts, firstly, that it is an agent of the state, rather than a private citizen, who is 
engaging in the instigation, and secondly, that the agent may be motivated to 
engage in such instigation for the purposes of securing a criminal conviction. 
But an undue emphasis on these features, I believe, has constrained our 
thinking about entrapment, leading us to overlook one of its central wrong-
making features. The key to grasping a further crucial dimension of 
entrapment’s wrongness lies elsewhere: namely, in identifying what, precisely, 
goes wrong when any moral agent induces another moral agent to act wrongly. 
 
                                                        
17 The standing theory is not alone in suffering from these two limitations. Culpability disavows 
punishment of entrapped offenders because they are not blameworthy, and Unfairness 
complains precisely about the punishment’s unfairness. 
18 I am thankful to an anonymous reviewer for clarifying this point. 
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A 
Consider a fictional but standard case of instigation. Barry suggests to Carl that 
he ought to kidnap and torture his neighbor, Leila, and proceeds to provide 
Carl with helpful information about when Leila will be home alone. Carl carries 
out the attack. Note that Barry is not coercing or exploiting Carl into 
perpetrating the crime; Carl’s responsibility is not diminished. So what, exactly, 
has Barry done wrong? In particular, whom has he wronged? The most familiar 
answer, of course, specifies that Barry has wronged Leila. By acting in ways that 
increase the likelihood that Carl would attack her, Barry has failed to regulate 
his conduct by appropriate concern for the value of Leila’s interests. The bad-
making feature of Barry’s instigation is that it exposes Leila to weighty risks of 
harm, and for no good reason. While Barry has not personally carried out the 
attack, he is an accessory to it. He is guilty of complicity in the attack. 
That Barry is complicit in posing a threat to Leila is one reason for 
objecting to his conduct.19 But it is vital to see that it is not the only thing 
objectionable about his conduct. Were Carl some dangerous machine that 
Barry had somehow mis-programmed, that would be so. But he is no machine; 
he is a moral agent. And as a moral agent, he, too, has a complaint against 
Barry, and it is this complaint that I seek to analyze. In inducing Carl to act 
wrongly, Barry is not simply relating to Leila disrespectfully. He is relating to 
Carl disrespectfully. By acting in ways that increase the likelihood that Carl’s 
                                                        
19 Here I follow the idea that, to be complicit in wrongdoing, one must have actually made a 
causal difference; Chiara Lepora and Robert E. Goodin, On Complicity and Compromise 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), and John Gardner, “Complicity and Causality,” in 
Offences and Defences: Selected Essays in the Philosophy of Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007). Cf. Christopher Kutz, Complicity: Ethics and Law for a Collective Age 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).  
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moral capacities will malfunction, Barry is failing to relate to Carl in the way 
that moral agents ought to relate to one another. 
 The explanation for that thesis is this. Barry owes it to Carl to regulate his 
choices by principles that are consistent with respect for Carl’s moral agency. 
What is it to respect Carl’s moral agency? Drawing on a familiar strand of 
contemporary political philosophy, let us stipulate that respecting Carl’s moral 
agency is a matter of respecting his two moral powers: firstly, his capacity to 
reason about right and wrong and regulate his conduct by the conclusions of 
that reasoning; and secondly, his capacity to conceive his own rational 
advantage, his own good, and pursue it. 20  Liberal political theory has a 
relatively rich understanding of what it is to disrespect an agent’s second moral 
power. The wrongfulness of paternalistic policies, for example, is best explained 
by the way that those policies fail to respect agents’ capacities to decide for 
themselves what is and what is not good for them.21 Indeed, policies that 
disrespect the second moral power need not even be straightforwardly coercive 
for them to be wrongful. Nations with an official state religion, in which 
adherence to that religion is deemed a matter of good citizenship, disrespect 
agents’ second moral power even if membership in the religion is legally 
optional.22 These familiar examples testify to just how deep the liberal concern 
with respecting the second moral power runs. Far less attention has been 
granted to what exactly is involved in respecting agents’ first moral power.  
                                                        
20 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), pp. 47ff. 
21 Jonathan Quong, Liberalism without Perfection (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 
80ff.  
22 Martha Nussbaum, “Perfectionist Liberalism and Political Liberalism,” Philosophy & Public 
Affairs, 39 (2011), 3-45, p. 35. 
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 When Barry goes out of his way to get Carl to trip up morally, he is failing 
to respect Carl’s first moral power. To see this, consider what is involved in 
actually respecting something. Respecting x consists, firstly, in the possession of 
a set of appropriate attitudes toward x, in virtue of its value, and, secondly, in 
the regulation of one’s conduct toward (or involving) x by norms that reflect 
those underlying appropriate attitudes.23 But what are the regulative attitudes 
involved in respecting the first moral power? I submit that there are two. 
Firstly, to respect a person’s first moral power involves recognizing the power’s 
existence: the person’s capacity to reason about the demands of morality and 
live up to those demands. But mere recognition is not enough. Moral agents 
don’t simply see one another as capable of living up to morality’s demands; they 
expect one another to live up to morality’s demands—in that phrase’s 
normative, rather than predictive, connotation. 24 It is precisely because we 
have such moral expectations of one another that we are frustrated with others 
when they fail to meet them. “Blame,” as Christine Korsgaard memorably notes, 
“declares to its object a greater faith than she has in herself.”25 Because the 
value of the first moral power inheres largely in its successful exercise, 
                                                        
23 This definition is broadly, though not entirely, ecumenical. For a rejection of the idea that 
respect involves attitudes, see Joseph Raz, Value, Respect, and Attachment (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 138. For the claim that such rejection is implausible, with 
which I agree, see Leslie Green, “Two Worries about Respect for Persons,” Ethics, 120 (2010), 
212-231, p. 219. 
24 That the expectation I have in mind is moral, rather than predictive, is crucial. There is 
nothing incompatible about acting in ways that increase an agent’s likelihood of moral failure 
while simultaneously holding the empirical expectation that she will nevertheless succeed in 
living up to her moral capacities (e.g., I can throw basketballs at an agent to try to stop her 
from swimming to rescue a drowning child, while nevertheless predicting that she will succeed 
anyway—since that’s how good a swimmer she is). I thank an anonymous reviewer for helping 
me see just how significant the distinction between moral and predictive expectation is. 
25 Christine Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), p. 196. 
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respecting that value involves an attitude of support for such exercise. Such an 
attitude of support is not a one-sided matter of moralistic condescension, with 
one side pointing fingers and making demands of others. It is the proper mark 
of all moral agents who reciprocally expect from one another moral success. 
And because such an attitude is regulative—it aims to govern our choices—
conduct that is incompatible with such an attitude is ruled out as disrespectful. 
 Thus the duty to respect the first moral power grounds a derivative duty 
not to engage in certain activity that increases the likelihood of others’ 
wrongdoing. Let us refer to such activity as subversion.26 There are two broad 
categories of subversion. The first, motivational subversion, transpires when an 
agent either creates a reason for another agent to act wrongly, or strengthens 
the practical force of a temptation the agent faces to act wrongly (such as 
through incitement). Think here of cases in which agents offer to pay other 
agents to perform some nefarious act, or offer descriptions of the benefits of 
perpetrating some injustice that render it more attractive. The second, 
epistemic subversion, transpires when an agent causes the formation of false 
beliefs in another agent. These beliefs may concern the substance of morality—
as, for example, when an agent convinces another agent to endorse and guide 
her actions by white supremacist convictions. Or they may concern the role of 
morality—as, for example, when an agent convinces another agent to regard 
moral reasons as on par with non-moral reasons, rather than decisive and 
regulative. And there are doubtlessly complex hybrid cases—as when an agent 
                                                        
26 This term is also used, albeit in a different context, by Allen Buchanan, “Philosophy and 
Public Policy: A Role for Social Moral Epistemology,” Journal of Applied Philosophy, 26 (2009), 
276-290.   
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convinces another agent of some fact that renders the latter’s behavior morally 
unproblematic (“It’s fine for you to drive—you haven’t drunk that much”27). All 
such activity subverts the operation of agents’ first moral power, and 
accordingly violates the duty to respect that power. Note that subversion need 
not involve one agent malevolently altering the conduct of some innocent 
party. Two co-principals in a wrongful enterprise, egging each other on to do 
evil, are mutually maltreating each other.  
 
B 
Many actions increase the likelihood of others’ wrongdoing. Should we 
condemn all of it? Does all of it qualify as the injustice of subversion? Surely 
not. This is partly because an agent is blameworthy for an action only when she 
knew or should have known that the action had the effects that it did. It is not 
murder when one electrocutes one’s neighbor by casually flicking on a light 
switch that normally works well but triggers a freak blast of electricity.28  
Mutatis mutandis, it goes, with subversion. 29 If a particular agent did not know, 
or could not reasonably have been expected to foresee, that her conduct would 
increase the likelihood of another’s wrongdoing, then she is clearly off the 
moral hook. 
 That clarification considerably narrows the range of conduct for which 
agents are appropriately condemned. But we must go further in tightening the 
                                                        
27 David Pears, Motivated Irrationality (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press, 1998).  
28 This example is from Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Realm of Rights (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1990), p. 229. 
29 My preference is to say that such an agent has not engaged in subversion at all, for 
subversion—like murder—refers to a particular type of culpable wrongdoing.  
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account. In many cases, it is plain that seemingly subversive activity is, in fact, 
perfectly proper. Consider two examples: 
 
1. Jones, a black man, walks down a street frequented by white 
supremacists, increasing the likelihood they will attack him. 
 
2. The government removes a tax subsidy that it had corruptly granted 
to the farming industry, effectively increasing that industry’s tax rates—
but also exacerbating the temptation faced by corporate farmers to cheat 
on their taxes or unjustifiably evade them. 
 
The proposition that racist assailants and tax evaders have a complaint against 
their putative tempters in these cases does not strike us simply as laughable; it 
strikes us as pernicious. But why? What distinguishes the class of cases in 
which a complaint of subversion is appropriate from cases in which it is not? 
Our answer is that the activities of Jones and the justice-seeking 
government are what I will call morally protected. Morally protected activity is 
activity that one has an antecedently established right or duty to engage in. In 
the case of Bob, he has a right to freedom of movement. And in the case of the 
government, it has not only a right to enact the just tax policy; it has a duty to 
do so. It would be implausible to say that the government has wronged the 
prospective tax cheats by assigning them their just tax rate.  
There is a temptation to say that all activity that increases the 
probability of moral failure in a given case is wrongful, but overridable by other 
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considerations. To use our first case: it is pro tanto wrong for Jones to take that 
walk, but given that he has a right to do so and we tend to think that rights are 
morally weighty, the moral calculus delivers the result that it is all-things-
considered justified to take the walk. This way of pursuing the analysis, 
however, is misguided in two ways.  
 Firstly, it yields the implausible result that we should feel regret, perhaps 
even owe compensation, for the white supremacists and the prospective tax-
cheats when we increase the likelihood that they will act wrongly. Secondly, 
however, it rests on a morally perverse understanding of the relation between 
ideal moral justice, on the one hand, and contingent facts about the probability 
of compliance with those standards, on the other. What it is that fundamental 
standards of justice protect and demand is invariant against changing 
probabilities of compliance.30 If the tax-wary farming executives are going to 
start shooting innocent children the moment the aforementioned tax is 
increased, or hijack the economy, that fact generates enforcement dilemmas 
that we must take seriously before deciding our next move. But it does not 
change the answer to the question: “what tax rates does justice ideally 
demand?” To answer that question, we do not need to know how much 
compliance or resistance certain tax rates are likely to elicit.  
In short, the wrongness of subversion enters the picture once we have 
already specified what persons’ fundamental rights and duties are; it does not 
affect their content. Indeed, we need a pre-existing account of what people’s 
                                                        
30 See G. A. Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008), 
and David Estlund, “Human Nature and the Limits (If Any) of Political Philosophy,” Philosophy 
& Public Affairs, 39 (2011), 207-237. 
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moral duties are in order for us to know what it even is to subvert—what it is to 
decrease the likelihood that people will not live up to their duties. Thus if the 
performance of my duty or exercise of my right happens to increase the 
likelihood of others’ wrongdoing, that does not void the existence of the duty 
or right.  
That is the analysis of how to think about morally protected activity that 
increases the likelihood of others’ moral failure. Beyond that zone, however, 
our thinking becomes more complex. Consider a fresh example: violent 
pornography. Many people hold the conviction that such pornography induces 
its consumers to commit violent acts. Assume this is so. Let’s also assume that 
violent pornography is not morally protected; even if agents have an interest in 
accessing it, it is not weighty enough to ground a right. Is it therefore morally 
impermissible to make and distribute violent pornography, given that, ex 
hypothesi, it increases viewers’ likelihood to engage in sexual violence? Here 
balancing could well be appropriate: we weigh the significance of the interests 
against the seriousness of the subversive risks.31  
 
C 
Subversion, then, is otherwise morally unprotected activity that foreseeably 
increases the likelihood that others’ first moral power will culpably operate 
defectively. One important subset of subversive injustices comprises actions 
that, independent of their subversive character, are already condemned as 
                                                        
31 A third possibility, of course, is that agents lack an interest in the relevant activity altogether, 
in which its subversive status would simply settle the matter. See Danny Scoccia, “Can Liberals 
Support a Ban on Violent Pornography?” Ethics, 106 (1996), 776-779.   
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wrongful. A racist lynching that foreseeably inspires copy-cats is wrong 
independent of its subversive effects. That it subverts, too, means that it is an 
even more horrifying—and complex—injustice than we initially supposed. In 
other cases, the only thing problematic with an action is that it increases the 
likelihood of others’ wrongdoing. Here there are typically two dimensions to 
the wrong, as in the aforementioned case of Barry, Carl, and Leila: Barry 
violates both his duty to Leila not to risk the violation of her rights, and his 
respect-based duty to Carl not to subvert his sense of justice. But there is also a 
class of “pure” cases in which subversion is, in fact, the only wrong that 
attaches to an act. This can happen if, for example, Barry was never going to let 
Carl get near Leila, and so was not, in fact, risking her rights, when he tried to 
persuade Carl to kidnap her. In such a case, the only thing Barry would be 
doing wrong is to subvert Carl’s moral agency.  
 My proposal is that ordinary entrapment by the state is this kind of case—
a case of pure subversion. When the FBI instigated young Muslim men to plan 
a synagogue bombing, there is no plausible sense in which the FBI were guilty 
of seriously risking the rights of the synagogue members, and thus as guilty of 
the additional wrong of complicity. The FBI took elaborate measures to ensure 
that no actual explosive material was ever actually in the entrapped citizens’ 
possession. Yet we nevertheless judge that the FBI did something wrong. Given 
the failure of the various arguments for entrapment earlier, we have heretofore 
lacked a convincing explanation as to what accounts for that intuition. The 
analysis of subversion furnishes precisely that account. 
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 The subversion-based account of entrapment differs from prevailing 
accounts in several ways. Notably, it refuses to locate the wrongness of 
entrapment (solely) in the prosecution and eventual punishment of the 
entrapped defendant. Given that entrapped defendants have committed, or 
attempted to commit, culpable wrongs—have perpetrated actions that 
constitute often significant failures to be moved by the value of others—it is 
not obvious why punishment is inappropriate. Note that believing that 
entrapped persons should still be punished is wholly consistent with the 
conviction that the government ought not to engage in entrapment. Here we 
hold the same attitude as in private incitement: we believe that the crime ought 
never to have been incited, but we believe the crime should nevertheless be 
punished. Thus police should be officially disallowed from engaging in 
entrapment. But if they do nevertheless engage in it, both they—and the 
culpable offenders they entrap—ought to be held accountable. 
 The claim that police should be disallowed from engaging in subversive 
activity raises the broader question of whether all subversive action, by all 
actors, should be prohibited. The account I have offered is committed to no 
such sweeping claim. Firstly, some instances of subversion will concern wrongs 
that are none of the state’s business. If I encourage Jones to break a promise to 
a friend, I am surely subverting him. But it is not an instance of subversion that 
should incur the public’s concern, since it is not the public’s concern whether 
or not Jones keeps his promises to his friends.32 These wrongs are not the state’s 
                                                        
32 This is, at least, a commonly held liberal position. For the argument that the law should only 
be concerned with public wrongs, see R.A Duff and Sandra Marshall, “Criminalization and 
Sharing Wrongs’’, Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 11, (1998), 7–22; and more 
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concern for the basic reason that they unrelated to the moral aims that justify 
the state’s authority: to create conditions that secure the liberty and 
opportunity of citizens.33 Thus we can distinguish between public subversion, 
which concerns the state, and private subversion, which does not. 
 Secondly, even once we have identified the instances of subversion that 
qualify as public, it is a further question which instances ought to face criminal 
sanction. A theorist’s answer to this question will depend on her preferred 
general theory of criminalization. According to wrongness-based theories of 
criminalization, the fact than an action is (publicly) wrong grounds a pro tanto 
reason to attach penalties to that action.34 Such views would ground a pro tanto 
case for criminalizing all instances of public subversion. But according to harm-
based theories of criminalization, one should hold a pro tanto commitment to 
criminalizing only those instances of public subversion that cause or risk 
wrongful harm.35 
 It is beyond the scope of this article to determine which theory of 
criminalization is correct. But notice the following. Firstly, many instances of 
subversive action that we intuitively judge to be criminalizable—such as 
instances of incitement to violence—are criminalizable under either theory. 
Secondly, instances of police entrapment that pose genuine risks of harm to 
                                                                                                                                                              
recently, ‘‘Public and Private Wrongs,” in James Chalmers et al. (eds.), Essays in Criminal Law in 
Honour of Sir Gerald Gordon (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), pp. 70–85. 
33 For a version of this view, which alters Joseph Raz’s theory of authority in an anti-
perfectionist direction, see Quong, Liberalism without Perfection, pp. 128ff.   
34 See R.A. Duff, “Towards a Modest Legal Moralism,” Criminal Law and Philosophy, 8 (2014), 
217-35.  
35 For the harm-based approach, see J.S. Mill , “On Liberty,” in On Liberty in Focus, ed. John 
Gray and G. W. Smith (London: Routledge, 1991), p. 30. For discussion of the harm-based 
standard of criminalization, see also Joel Feinberg, Harm to Others (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1984), p. 26. Feinberg suggests the possibility of prohibiting non-harmful 
conduct in his Harmless Wrongdoing (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 323ff. 
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third-parties—such as when police officers attempt to convince persons to 
initiate an attack, with the intent to stop the attack but no guarantee they will 
succeed—are criminalizable under either theory. Thirdly, instances of police 
entrapment that do not pose genuine risks of harm to a third party are 
wrongful principally in virtue of the disrespect they express to the moral agents 
they subvert. Thus we might think that these cases of entrapment can only be 
prohibited if one endorses a wrongness-based theory. But this is misguided: 
even a defender of the harm-based standard can explain why harmless 
entrapment cases should be disallowed. When it comes to setting state policy, 
we have reason for insisting on a higher threshold for government officials than 
“do no harm.” Even if a publicly established religion did no harm, it would still 
express disrespect for citizens who were not adherents to that established 
religion.36 This is a sufficient reason to disallow such a policy, and to discipline 
state officials who contravene it. Likewise, the disrespect that the state 
communicates to citizens by entrapping them—even if there is no risk of harm 
to third parties—objectionably disrespects them, which is sufficient grounds 
for prohibiting such operations.37 
 Thus the account I have offered generates strong grounds for prohibiting 
entrapment. But because it also alters our understanding of why, precisely, 
entrapment is problematic, it gives guidance in determining what kinds of 
interventions are liable to condemnation. It does so in two important ways. 
Firstly, it condemns a greater degree of police action than prevailing views 
                                                        
36 Nussbaum, “Perfectionist Liberalism and Political Liberalism.” 
37 It is a further question whether contravention of this prohibition should be handled through 
disciplinary proceedings within the police force, or through the justice system. 
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condemn. Many political defenders of proactive police efforts wish to restrain 
the definition of entrapment. One popular approach suggests that if an agent 
already possessed an inclination to commit the relevant crime, then police 
solicitation or persuasion is not objectionable. This so-called “subjective test” is 
the favored approach in U.S. federal courts, for whom the relevant question is 
whether the putatively entrapped agent did or did not have a “predisposition” 
to commit the crime. If the prosecution can prove that the defendant already 
possessed a predisposition, then the fact that officials provided her with an 
opportunity to commit it, even if they encouraged her, is immaterial. It is not 
entrapment.  
  The subversion-based view, however, condemns this approach as 
insufficiently nuanced. How could the mere fact that an agent is more 
susceptible to certain temptations than others—thereby harboring a putative 
“predisposition”—make it appropriate for the state to exacerbate that 
susceptibility? Even if she already faces a higher-than-average probability of 
committing some crime, it is still wrong to ratchet up that probability.38 The 
subversion-based approach, then, insists that many more policing operations 
be deemed entrapment, and thus regarded as unacceptable, than present U.S. 
practice suggests.39 
                                                        
38 The lesser-used “objective test” in U.S. law deems police conduct objectionable only if it 
would induce a statistically average person to commit the relevant crime. On the subversion-
based view, however, it is not clear why facts about statistical regularities in agents’ 
susceptibility to wrongdoing should be any more salient to our determination of whether the 
state has acted wrongly than facts about particular individuals’ susceptibility to wrongdoing. 
For discussion on these tests, see Andrew Altman and Steven Lee, “Legal Entrapment,” 
Philosophy & Public Affairs, 12 (1983), 51-69. 
39 This is not to suggest that it is never appropriate for police to use deceptive tactics. If an 
agent has already formed the intention to act wrongly and begun to plan a criminal plot, the 
agent’s likelihood of moral failure is approaching certainty. The police do not subvert that 
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 Secondly, the subversion-based account gives us no reason to be 
concerned only with intentional instances of entrapment.40 They are obviously 
the most familiar; police who entrap do so intentionally to boost conviction 
rates. But it is important to note that there is nothing in our definition of 
subversion that necessitates that subversion be intentional in order to be 
wrongful. It is, in this respect, like manifold other wrongs: it can be perpetrated 
negligently as well as intentionally. Suppose I’m headed to the store, and John 
asks me to drop him off at his ex-girlfriend’s, Betty’s, on the way. John is fuming 
with rage, and I know, or could reasonably have been expected to know, that 
Betty was sensibly seeking a restraining order against John due to his repeated 
violent threats against her. Suppose that if I don’t give him a ride, he won’t be 
able to get to hers. I give him a ride. Unlike an agent provocateur, I do not 
intend to increase the likelihood of a morally heinous act by John in this 
situation. But my act nevertheless constitutes a failure to support his moral 
capacities. 
 Of course, intentional subversion is more blameworthy than negligent 
subversion: the attitudes betrayed by someone who deliberately plans to make 
someone else fail morally are more pernicious than the attitudes of someone 
who carelessly subverts. But as a matter of act-evaluation (rather than agent-
appraisal), negligent subversion can still be seriously wrongful because of its 
effects. For a morally unprotected act to qualify as the culpable wrong of 
                                                                                                                                                              
agent when they contrive a sting operation to catch him in the act. Police officers who 
perpetrate such sting operations are rightly exempt from accomplice liability, as they typically 
are. An account of how to operationalize this insight is beyond the scope of this article. For 
instructive discussion, see Redmayne, “Exploring Entrapment.” 
40 Cf. Hock Lai Ho, “State Entrapment,” Legal Studies, 31 (2007): 71-95, pp. 73ff.  
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subversion, then, what matters is that it foreseeably increases the likelihood of 
moral failure. This feature of my view is a sobering one. For it reveals that 
subversion could well be all around us—not in its intentional guise, but in its 
negligent guise.   
 
III. Structural Entrapment 
A 
The subversion-based analysis has a double pay-off. In addition to revealing a 
distinct dimension of entrapment’s wrongness that other accounts do not 
capture, it helps us identify entrapment-like phenomena in places where we 
never imagined them. I shall focus on one particularly important instance of 
negligent subversion, which transpires when the government enacts laws that 
have the foreseeable consequence of setting up citizens to fail morally. While 
the phenomenon I will describe is not similar to ordinary entrapment in all 
respects, it is similar in the crucial respect that it is subversive, and accordingly 
wrongful for the same reason.  
 Let us use the suggestive phrase structural entrapment to refer to 
conditions in which agents are subjected to morally unprotected features of 
their social structure that increase the likelihood of their own moral failure.41 
To establish that a law, or a cluster of laws, perpetrates structural entrapment, 
it is therefore necessary to answer two questions affirmatively. Firstly, do the 
                                                        
41 The only other usages of the term “structural entrapment” concern, firstly, safety regulations 
(e.g., babies becoming trapped in cribs) and, secondly, biochemistry. The idea that we might 
think of ghetto youth as “entrapped” is suggested in Douglas G. Glasgow, The Black Underclass 
(London: Jossey-Bass, 1980). Note that punishment is not part of my definition, though it is of 
course true that the state punishes many of those whom it structurally entraps. 
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laws foreseeably increase the likelihood of agents’ wrongdoing—for example, 
by creating or exacerbating temptations to act wrongly, or by inducing the 
formation of false moral beliefs? This question is at root an empirical question 
that depends on social scientific inquiry. Secondly, are the laws in question 
morally unprotected? To say that a law is morally protected is to say that the 
activity of enacting and enforcing the law is activity that the state has an 
antecedently established right or duty to engage in.42  One obvious instance of 
a morally unprotected law, of course, is a law that we already have decisive 
reason to regard as unjust. Thus the allegation that a set of laws perpetrates 
structural entrapment depends upon both empirical and normative 
argumentation.  
 How might the state set up its own citizens to fail through the contexts its 
unjust laws create? Here I shall focus on one particular example, which I will 
use to illustrate the existence and significance of structural entrapment. 
Consider a particularly egregious instance of moral failure: homicide. Taking 
the year 2010 as a reasonably representative year in recent history, 16,238 
persons were murdered in the U.S. that year. Of those 16,238, 2,020 of them 
were gang-related.43 Gangs can be extraordinarily violent organizations. Not 
only do they perpetrate an alarming quantity of murders, they regularly engage 
in violence of less severe but still egregious sorts—assault, rape, and 
                                                        
42 Remember that even laws that protect negative rights demand positive “doings” of the state 
to enact, administer, and enforce the attendant regulatory and legal regime. Liam Murphy and 
Thomas Nagel, Taxes and Justice: The Myth of Ownership (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2004).  
43 http://www.nationalgangcenter.gov/survey-analysis/measuring-the-extent-of-gang-problems 
 25 
destruction of public and private property.44 Moreover, the kinds of violence in 
which gangs engage is not restricted to fellow gang members. Non-members 
regularly find themselves unluckily caught in the crossfire of inter-gang urban 
warfare. These phenomena are particularly striking in the contemporary United 
States, but are by no means excluded to it. In the United Kingdom, rape is an 
increasingly common tool of gang violence, as gang leaders draw up lists of 
women—usually sisters or girlfriends of rival gang members—to be targeted as 
retaliation for transgressions.45  
 Needless to say, these acts constitute egregious instances of culpable 
wrongdoing. Even if we somehow regarded urban ghettos as similar in certain 
respects to a Hobbesian state of nature, the suggestion that agents in such 
contexts lack natural moral duties to refrain from harm against innocents 
would strike most contemporary liberal political theorists—and citizens—as 
implausible.46 The members of America’s gangs who murder young children, 
and of Britain’s gangs who rape the sisters of gang members, are surely 
blameworthy for the deplorable choices that they make.  
 But they are not, I suggest, the only ones to blame. If unjust policies 
themselves make it rational for citizens to join and remain in gangs, thereby 
positioning them to perpetrate wrongs that they would have been otherwise 
less likely to perform, blame is also rightly allocated to the state for violating its 
duty to refrain from subversion. I air that claim in deliberately conditionalized 
form. Establishing the truth of each conditional depends upon elaborate 
                                                        
44 http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/2011-national-gang-threat-assessment 
45 http://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/jul/19/gangs-rape-lists-sex-assault 
46 Cf. Sarah Buss, “Justified Wrongdoing,” Noûs, 31 (1997), 337-369.  
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empirical argumentation—that the relevant laws do, in fact, increase the 
likelihood of moral wrongdoing—and normative argumentation—that the 
relevant laws are unjust and so, a fortiori, morally unprotected. I will gesture 
toward, though not exhaustively defend, those arguments here. My purpose is 
simply to deepen our understanding of what structural entrapment might 
involve by exploring one possible manifestation of it in contemporary political 
life.  
 How might the state’s unjust policies induce participation in violent 
criminal gangs? Here, briefly, is the kind of story I have in mind: 
 Unjust economic policies and educational policies together create a 
structure in which numerous citizens are stranded without access to stable and 
gainful employment in their home communities.47 Faced with disempowering 
social exclusion48 and a lack of meaningful prospects, many citizens rationally 
conclude that the prudentially optimal option is to join a gang, which furnishes 
the social bases of their self-respect, enabling them to embrace an identity of 
which they are proud.49 Meanwhile, dire financial straits make it rational for 
citizens to perpetrate illegal activities to make money, the risky but lucrative 
sale of narcotics.50 Gangs are enlisted in this business, becoming the street arms 
of powerful criminal organizations. That the sale of narcotics is illegal leads to 
                                                        
47 William Julius Wilson, When Work Disappears: The World of the New Urban Poor (New York: 
Knopf, 1999). 
48 Elizabeth Anderson, The Imperative of Integration (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2010). 
49 Elijah Anderson, Code of the Street: Decency, Violence, and the Moral Life of the Inner City 
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999); Scott H. Decker and Barrik Van Winkle, Life in 
the Gang (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
49 See Robert Garot, Who You Claim? Performing Gang Identity in School and on the Streets 
(New York: NYU Press, 2010), especially pp. 70-3. 
50 Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh, Off the Books: The Underground Economy of the Urban Poor 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006). For discussion of how  
 27 
all the pathological features of black markets, in which disputes are rationally 
resolved through violence.51 That gang members’ self-worth is connected to the 
success of the gangs themselves means that injuries from rival gangs are 
construed as intolerable affronts, moving members to re-assert their interests 
and identity through violence.52 Under-enforced and unjustly permissive gun 
laws enable gang members to acquire lethal weapons. Risks to physical safety 
faced by appearing “unmanly” or deferential on the street makes it rational to 
flaunt those weapons and risk provoking lethal altercations, rather than 
develop a comparably fatal reputation as weak.53 When arrested for their 
crimes, unproductive and often unfair punishments meted out by the courts do 
little but harden offenders’ gang allegiance and self-understanding as 
professional criminals.54  
 This is the kind of story that needs to be justified in order to make an 
indictment of structural entrapment. It need not always be this complex; in 
some cases, it may simply be one important law that exerts subversive effects. 
In others—like the case I have described—it may be a matter of interaction 
between different morally unprotected laws. There are, of course, numerous 
pitfalls involved in advancing the requisite arguments. I shall explain what they 
are, again with illustrative reference to my example case. 
                                                        
51 Jeffrey Miron, “Violence, Guns, and Drugs: A Cross-Country Analysis,” Journal of Law & 
Economics 44 (2001): 615. 
52 Jeffrey Fagan and Deanna L. Wilkinson, “Guns, Youth Violence, and Social Identity in Inner 
Cities,” in Crime and Justice, Vol. 24, ed. Michael Tonry and Mark H. Moore (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1998), pp. 104–88. 
53 See Garot, Who You Claim?  
54 Margaret P. Spencer, “Sentencing Drug Offenders: The Incarceration Addiction,” Villanova 
Law Review 40, 2 (1995): 335-81; Marc Miller and Daniel J. Freed, “The Disproportionate 
Imprisonment of Low-Level Drug Offenders,” Federal Sentencing Reporter 7, 1 (1994): 3-6; Marc 
Mauer, “The Causes and Consequences of Prison Growth in the United States,” Punishment & 
Society 3, 1 (2001): 9-20. 
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B 
Firstly, it is not sufficient simply to show that the laws in question increase the 
likelihood of crime simpliciter. What matters is that the crimes are morally 
wrongful. This is why our example case concerns clearly wrongful crimes such 
as homicide, assault, and rape. It may be that certain crimes are, in fact, 
morally justified. As Tommie Shelby has powerfully argued, citizens who are 
subjected to unfair terms by a particular social and economic basic structure 
may not be obliged to comply with those terms.55 Accordingly, certain crimes—
like fraud, tax evasion, or peaceful sale of narcotics—could be permissible.56 As 
such, they would not count as instances of wrongdoing, and so acts that 
increase their likelihood would not qualify as subversive. 57 
 Secondly, in determining whether a law is morally unprotected, we need 
not rely on claims about what perfect justice requires in the ideal society. There 
is and always will be intense reasonable disagreement about which laws and 
policies might meet that exacting standard. Diagnosticians of structural 
entrapment do better to focus on laws that are flagrantly unjust—that no 
reasonable conception of justice could defend. Arguably, on matters of justice 
about which people can have reasonable disagreement, the reasonable position 
that is ratified democratically is politically legitimate—citizens are bound by its 
                                                        
55 Tommie Shelby, “Justice, Deviance, and the Dark Ghetto,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 35 
(2007): 126-60.  
56 Shelby, of course, agrees that natural duties to refrain from harm obtain in the urban ghetto; 
see “Justice, Deviance, and the Dark Ghetto,” pp. 151ff.  
57 Though they may be problematic for other reasons. Cf. Jonathan Wolff and Avner de Shalit, 
Disadvantage (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 48ff. 
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strictures—and so is morally protected.58 The vast preponderance of law in 
contemporary liberal democracies no doubt falls within this category: provided 
the laws are affirmed through standard democratic procedures, and do not run 
afoul of certain substance-based constraints, complaints that such laws may 
subvert are out of place. 
Consider again our example case, which concerns a range of unjust 
policies concerning welfare, housing, drugs, guns, and punishment. To show, 
for example, that prevailing economic policy in the urban U.S. is morally 
unprotected does not depend on demonstrating the truth of a particular 
principle of distributive justice, like Rawls’s difference principle. It is enough 
simply to show that prevailing economic policy would be deemed as unjust by 
all reasonable conceptions of justice—for example, because redistributive 
transfers are inadequate,59 or because a minimally plausible conception of 
equality of opportunity is not fulfilled.  
Note, too, that even if a statute’s justice is a matter of reasonable 
disagreement, it could still be regarded as beyond the pale in virtue of the 
penalty attached to its contravention. Take drug policy. It is not necessary to 
endorse the reasonably controvertible argument that drug bans necessarily 
                                                        
58 This way of thinking about political legitimacy is traceable to Rawls, Political Liberalism. See 
also Quong, Liberalism Without Perfection, p. 133. 
59 That could be true even for libertarians. See Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New 
York: Basic Books, 1974), p. 231, where Nozick contends that historic injustices justify 
compensatory redistribution from rich to poor. While I have run my argument from an 
explicitly liberal-egalitarian perspective, nothing I have said in this essay is necessarily 
incompatible with basic libertarian ideals. Insofar as libertarians ground their deontology in 
fundamental Kantian claims about respect for persons’ moral personality—as Nozick suggests 
in Anarchy, State, and Utopia, p. 32-33—it is at least possible to run an argument from 
libertarian premises to the conclusion that committed libertarians have strong moral reasons 
not to encourage or induce their fellow moral agents to violate others’ natural rights. 
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violate the autonomy of citizens and are beyond the pale for that reason.60 All 
we need to do to affirm that prevailing penalties are unjust. Even if it is in 
principle permissible for the state to prohibit the sale and use of certain 
narcotics, the current penalties enacted against drug criminals are 
disproportionate by any reasonable standard of proportionality. 61  This is 
sufficient for such penalties to be regarded as beyond the pale. 
Thirdly, in order to diagnose a law as subversive, it is not necessary that 
the character of subversion be identical across all subverted citizens. In our 
example case, I doubt that there is one species of subversion transpiring for all 
persons in such circumstances. For some, the policies simply heighten 
temptations to commit violent crime—a straightforward instance of 
motivational subversion. These citizens hope for a better day when they need 
not kill and assault their fellow citizens to survive, and they believe that what 
they are doing is wrong, but they cannot seem to break from their current 
situation: to attain certain fundamental goods of income, belonging, and 
security, participation in gang violence is prudentially rational. For others, 
however, the subversion may be more problematic. For some, their 
circumstances may have led them to hold false beliefs about the role that 
morality rightly plays in their practical reasoning—thinking that what they do 
is wrong, but that reasons of self-interest rightly override the demands of 
justice. That is a serious error in reasoning. But for a third group, things may be 
even darker. They may well believe that they hold stringent moral obligations 
                                                        
60 Doug Husak, “Liberal Neutrality, Autonomy, and Drug Prohibitions,” Philosophy & Public 
Affairs, 29 (2000): 43-80.   
61  Spencer, “Sentencing Drug Offenders,” and Miller and Freed, “The Disproportionate 
Imprisonment of Low-Level Drug Offenders,” Federal Sentencing Reporter, 7 (1994): 3-6. 
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to their fellow gang members to fight and kill, no matter the costs on the 
surrounding community.62 Those gangsters may be the most subverted of all—
not simply tempted, not simply confused about morality’s role, but indeed 
possessed by disastrously mistaken views about what justice demands.63 
 Social deprivation, we can conclude, is far more morally objectionable 
than liberal political philosophers have acknowledged. It is not problematic 
simply in virtue of the fact that it is the upshot of a social structure that does 
not comport with fundamental principles of distributive justice. It is not 
problematic simply in virtue of the fact that it imperils innocent citizens’ safety 
by increasing crime. Far more perniciously, it constitutes an assault on the 
endeavors of citizens to exercise their first moral power. 
 
C 
Consider an objection to this argument. Perhaps it is not the state’s crushing 
injustices that are centrally responsible for inducing criminal wrongdoing in 
our inner cities; it is, rather, its leniency.64 Even if it is true that certain social 
policies trigger criminal temptations, the job of the criminal law is precisely to 
counteract such temptations by stacking the decks of prudential self-interest 
against wrongdoing. On this view, if the state were to threaten and effectively 
enforce significantly harsher punishments on its citizens, it would deter crime 
far more successfully. Rather than complain of structural entrapment, we 
should instead complain about objectionably light punishments. Perhaps 
                                                        
62 Cf. Seth Lazar, “Associative Duties and the Ethics of Killing in War,” Journal of Practical 
Ethics, 1 (2013): 3-48.  
63 See, especially, Anderson, Code of the Street, and Decker and Van Winkle, Life in the Gang. 
64 I am thankful to an anonymous reviewer for elaborating this instructive objection.  
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criminals themselves can even complain that they are not being held to account 
as rigorously as is proper.   
 We can wholeheartedly accept that significantly harsher penalties could 
well override the criminogenic effects of social policies. And if it is true, then 
one ready option available to state authorities seeking to eliminate structural 
entrapment is indeed to erect greater penalties to undo the criminogenic 
effects of subversive laws. Even if the kinds of policies I’ve described do 
incentivize criminal wrongdoing, as I have suggested they might, the increased 
magnitude of agents’ prudential reasons to avoid punishment could well neuter 
those policies’ effects. To avoid the indictment of structural entrapment, then, 
a state merely needs to ratchet up the severity of its criminal laws. Especially if 
the increases do not render the penalties disproportionately harsh—i.e., beyond 
the severity ceiling of punishment for the crimes in question—this may be both 
a workable solution and a desirable one. 
 Whether this would work is, of course, an empirical matter. Perhaps 
draconian penalties would be as likely to result in resistance as in compliance. 
Even if it worked, however, responding to structural entrapment by getting 
tougher on crime could have normative costs that rightly make us worry about 
its moral desirability. Given that prevailing penalties in the U.S., for example, 
are widely believed to be disproportionately harsh already, this strategy could 
well exacerbate penal injustice. 65  Getting tough on crime would thus 
                                                        
65 For the idea that prevailing drug sentences are disproportionate, see Douglas Husak, “Desert, 
Proportionality, and the Seriousness of Drug Offences,” in Andrew Ashworth and Martin Wasik 
(eds), Fundamentals of Sentencing Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), pp. 187-219. 
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accomplish a morally laudable end—the elimination of structural 
entrapment—through morally regrettable means—the infliction of 
disproportionate punishment. The moral life involves compromises, of course, 
and there could well be circumstances in which this was the all-things-
considered right approach.  But we should be sceptical of this approach as 
anything more than a lamentable, short-term solution. I doubt that the ideal 
response to unjust social policies that have criminogenic effects is to enact 
fresh unjust policies that undermine those criminogenic effects but leave the 
initial unjust social policies intact. A better response, if it is politically feasible, 
is instead to replace the unjust social policies with just ones.66 And if it’s not 
politically feasible, then we should at the very least recognize that getting 
tough on crime could well necessitate the pro tanto wrong of disproportionate 
punishment. 
 
IV. Responding to Structural Entrapment 
I have argued that one feature of ordinary entrapment that should 
unambiguously lead us to condemn it—its subversive character—should lead 
us to condemn certain criminogenic social policies, as well. I have outlined 
what is involved in diagnosing the phenomenon of structural entrapment, 
using a salient example to explain the kinds of considerations political theorists 
should consider in pursues their diagnoses. But what follows once an instance 
                                                        
66 For discussion of the role of feasibility in normative political theory, see Holly Lawford-
Smith, “Understanding Political Feasibility,” The Journal of Political Philosophy, 21 (2013), 243-
259. 
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of structural entrapment has been identified? What kinds of prescriptions 
follow this kind of diagnosis?  
 Firstly, the subversion-based account helps identify the right way to think 
about the perennially fraught matter of how to allocate blameworthiness in our 
public arguments. Consider again our example case. Citizens across the West 
have long been engaged in a standoff about how to think about urban violence, 
with rightists insisting upon criminals’ own responsibility for wrongdoing and 
leftists insisting that we focus on crime’s social genesis. The subversion-based 
account provides an intellectual resolution to this popular dispute by 
explaining why both sides are right: those who unleash mayhem on the streets 
of our inner cities are blameworthy for doing so, and we are blameworthy for 
negligently making them more likely to do so. Even though they act heinously, 
those murderers have a complaint against their government—a complaint that 
goes beyond the litany of illiberal and anti-egalitarian policies to which they 
have been subjected.  
 Secondly, consider the matter of how those who have been structurally 
entrapped should subsequently be treated. One significant result of my account 
is that whatever holds for ordinarily entrapped offenders should also hold, 
mutatis mutandis, for structurally entrapped offenders. Consider the popular 
idea that citizens entrapped by the police into committing crime ought not to 
be punished. As we saw earlier, one potential justification of that idea holds 
that the state lacks the moral standing to punish those it entraps. We can now 
see how that view would scale up: if the state forfeits its standing to punish 
those whom it has entrapped through a sting operation, then it forfeits its 
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standing to punish those whom it has entrapped through its unjust social 
structures. 67 
This radical result depends, of course, on the claim that the argument 
from loss of standing does, in fact, succeed in the micro-case. If it cannot 
succeed there, when the state entraps intentionally, then a fortiori it will not 
succeed in the negligent case of structural entrapment. It is beyond the scope 
of this essay to settle this vexed matter; nothing in my analysis of subversion 
necessitates the standing argument’s success or failure. Certainly, the intuition 
that A lacks the standing to blame B for something that A himself encouraged 
or induced B to do is a powerful one. But powerful, too, is the intuition that 
certain dangerous offenders, albeit entrapped, should not walk free. That holds 
for the micro-case—think of those men lured into bombing synagogues from 
earlier—and perhaps even more strongly for the macr0-case—think of rival 
gangsters who engage in a shootout across a crowded playground of innocent 
children. Only a comprehensive theory of criminal punishment can settle 
which of these intuitions should take precedence.68 Current law often opts for a 
compromise in the case of ordinary entrapment, treating dangerous and non-
dangerous offenders asymmetrically: namely, by letting the latter off the hook, 
                                                        
67 The idea that the state lacks the standing to punish victims of its own injustice who commit 
crime is defended by R.A Duff, “Blame, Moral Standing, and the Legitimacy of the Criminal 
Trial,” Ratio, 23 (2010): 123-40, on the grounds that justified blame presupposes an attitude of 
reciprocity, and by Victor Tadros, “Poverty and Criminal Responsibility,” Journal of Value 
Inquiry, 43 (2009): 391-413, on the grounds that poverty-perpetuating states are complicit in the 
crimes of the poor. Duff briefly considers—and then dismisses—the idea that we should think 
of socially deprived offenders as tantamount to entrapped offenders; pp. 133ff. 
68 Expressivist theorists, for whom punishment is essentially a matter of communicating 
condemnation to wrongdoers, are likely to hesitate at punishing entrapped offenders, whereas 
those who ground punishment in the duties of offenders to compensate or apologize to their 
victims are likely to insist that such duties are not dissolved by entrapment.  
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but not the former.69 My point is simply this: whatever we end up believing 
about the micro-case, we should be broadly prepared to embrace its 
implications for the structural case, too.70 
 Even if we end up concluding that the state should still punish subverted 
offenders—something that my analysis does not preclude—it hardly follows 
that those offenders lack a complaint against their state: it has, after all, 
violated its duty not to subvert their sense of justice. Indeed, one powerful 
payoff of the subversion-based view is that all subverted agents have a 
complaint, qua subverted agents, whether or not they acquiesce to subversive 
pressures and ultimately commit crime. As Elijah Anderson describes it, most 
people in urban ghettos are simply trying to live their lives by mainstream, or 
“decent,” values. 71  But they, too, have been subjected to pressures and 
pressures, and while they have withstood them, they nevertheless have grounds 
to complain.72 
 A third implication is this. My project here is one of non-ideal theory—
helping citizens and officials decide what they have reason to do in the face of 
injustice—and it is commonly believed that, in non-ideal theory, it is more 
                                                        
69 This approach is recommended by the U.S. Model Penal Code, Article 2, Section 2.13, Part 3. 
Perhaps a compromise between these intuitions is, in fact, the right result. Tadros, for example, 
is sympathetic to the idea that unjust states do wrong when they punish victims of their own 
injustice, but they also do wrong when they refrain from punishing them (because they thereby 
fail to prevent future crimes); see his “Poverty and Criminal Responsibility,” Journal of Value 
Inquiry 43, (2009): 391-413, pp. 412-413. He is not, however, discussing this with reference to 
entrapment, but it has instructive implications.  
70 I say “broadly” because there may, of course, be some important differences, traceable to the 
intentionality/negligence distinction. One reason we might proscribe punishment of entrapped 
offenders in the ordinary case is to disincentivize conviction-hungry police from engaging in it, 
since it would be prove pointless. But since legislatures tend not to enact unjust social policies 
for the purpose of inducing crime, it is unlikely that proscribing punishment in that case would 
be similarly effective.  
71 Anderson, Code of the Street. 
72 Even those in such neighborhoods whose probabilities were unaffected can be regarded as 
victims of “attempted subversion.” 
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important to eliminate more “grievous” injustices first.73 Now it is commonly 
supposed that socioeconomic injustice, while serious, is less grievous than 
violations of basic liberties.74 This suggests that we ought to focus our energy 
on preventing and remedying violations of basic liberties, only secondarily 
turning our attention to comparatively less important matters of 
socioeconomic injustice. If I am right, however, that prevailing socioeconomic 
injustices are subversive, this makes them significantly morally worse than we 
initially believed. We have stronger reasons to abolish the unjust policies that I 
have discussed than we otherwise might have had. They should, in virtue of 
their subversive status, command a higher priority on the schedule of injustices 
that we ought to be committed to eliminating in our efforts as citizens. The 
most important way for democracies to respond to structural entrapment is, 
then, to stop perpetrating it. 
                                                        
73 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 214. For instructive discussion on this point, see A. John 
Simmons, “Ideal and Nonideal Theory,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, 38 (2010): 5-36, pp. 18ff. 
74 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 214ff.  
